Trump's Doha Agreement Was Worse Than You Think
The Betrayal Started with Him
Azmat always liked to play BBC Pashto during our lunch breaks.
“Ok, Will Khan,” he would remind me. “You will need to summarize each news segment.”
It was 20 February 2020, and I was in language school studying Dari and Pashto before my deployment to Afghanistan in June 2020.
BBC Pashto, of course, led with what turned out to be the most fateful news in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s short twenty-year lifespan. The cameras showed President Donald Trump’s Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalizad, who had served as an Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations under President George W. Bush’s administration, signing “The Doha Agreement” in Doha, Qatar. Seated to his left was the Taliban Deputy Leader, Mullah Baradar, who Pakistan released from “house arrest” due to pressure from the Trump administration.
“What do you think, Azmat?” I queried.
“Brother, it will not work,” he insisted. “These are terrorists. They are not interested in peace with you.”
I was more optimistic than Azmat. I didn’t like that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had excluded the Afghan government, but perhaps it was necessary. The United States still had 8,000 troops in Afghanistan. They had more than enough firepower to act as a stick to any carrots they may dangle in front of the Taliban.
Azmat was correct, of course. And that’s something I would learn during my final year in Afghanistan. From June 2020 to June 2021, I served as the United States Air Attache to the United States Embassy in Kabul. I met with hundreds of senior Afghan government officials, general officers, politicians, and every one in between.
The Afghans had the will and desire to fight. However, President Trump’s Doha agreement not only set a date for our future withdrawal, it delivered a fatal stab in the back to our Afghan brothers and sisters. It was a wound that eventually killed our allies. Although President Biden had the opportunity to reverse course, which he should have, President Trump, Secretary Pompeo, and Ambassador Khalizad are the trio that delivered our allies to the killers of America’s sons and daughters.
I watched all of this unfold with front-row seats to the Islamic Republic’s ultimate demise.
“Mullah Baradar”
When I wanted to speak with an Afghan who understood the Taliban, I always turned to my brother, Colonel Abdul Rahman Rahmani, a former Special Mission Wing pilot who rose through the Afghan government’s ranks, serving inside its Office of the National Security (ONSC), which was designed to mirror our National Security Council.
Rahmani wasn’t just an astute Afghan intelligence officer; he also understood the Taliban, having grown up near their madrassas. During our conversations about the Taliban’s leader, the topic often centered around Mullah Baradar, the supposedly “moderate” Deputy Taliban leader under Haibitullah Akhunzada. His supposed moderation was often a topic of humor between us.
“How’s my favorite “moderate” Taliban leader doing at Doha,” I would often ask Rahmani.
“He’s swindling you guys,” he would rejoin. “Good thing Zalmay got him released from ISI custody.”
In 2018, Zalmay Khalizad, the Trump administration’s man in Afghanistan, pressured the Pakistani government to release Baradar, who the Pakistani and Americans detained in a “secret joint raid” of both intelligence services in 2010. In less than eight years, he’d gone from a jackpot detainment to a free man because there was a perception that he was a “moderate.”
“There are no moderates in extremist organizations,” said Ahmad Shuja Jamal, a former member of Afghanistan’s Office of the National Security Council and author of The Decline and Fall of Republican Afghanistan. “Anybody who joins must be an extremist or they wouldn’t be allowed to join.”
The Trump administration likely believed that by releasing Baradar from custody, he would help them at the negotiating table at Doha. Instead, Mullah Baradar helped craft an alluring narrative that captured the imagination of the very interlocutors who helped release him from prison.
“American negotiators fell for the Taliban’s tricks,” Mohammad Taleb, a member of the Afghan negotiating team, told GCV+F. “The Taliban convinced them that they were the problem and that once they left, everything would be ok.”
Former President Donald Trump, the master negotiator, literally released the Deputy Taliban Leader, a man with the blood of thousands of Americans on his hands, out of prison in the hopes of using that bit of good gesture to secure himself a promising deal. Instead, Mullah Baradar, displaying the even-tempered patience he’s known for, accepted early release and crafted an agreement that led to the Taliban’s victory.
The Road to Intra-Afghan Peace Talks
My time meeting and learning from Lieutenant General Hibatullah Alizai was invaluable. As a former Corps Commander in northern Afghanistan, LTG Alizai had learned invaluable lessons working alongside “regional powerbrokers.” But as the Afghan National Army Special Operations Corps Commander, LTG Alizai had Afghan Commandos scattered across 34 provinces conducting some of the most complex and daring missions imaginabile.
“General, how are you and your family doing?”
I always asked about my Afghan partners’ families because they served on the front lines, too. During America’s fateful final year in Afghanistan, the Taliban executed a deadly assassination campaign, having successfully infiltrated numerous intelligence services despite the Central Intelligence Agency’s best efforts.
“They are safe, brother,” he often said, “But I’m very worried for my men.”
Like all battlefield leaders, General Alizai’s always worried about his commandos in the field.
“Is there anything in particular this time?”
By the fall of 2020, the Trump administration’s Doha Agreement had punctured the Afghan National Army’s morale. Imagine, if you can, serving on the front lines at a checkpoint while your family is hunted by a terrorist organization that your supposed ally signed an agreement with. Would you continue serving?
“The Doha Greement changed the military, the political, the social and economic fundamentals of Afghanistan,” said Ahmad Shuja. “Because a country, its civil order, the supremacy of the people, and its instutions only work when everybody knows that when they wake up the following morning, everything will be okay.”
The slow-motion breakdown of Afghan society didn’t worry my good friend because he had more immediate concerns. Instead, Mike Pompeo decided to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners that had him up at night.
“Brother, I don’t understand what you guys are doing?” he asked querulously. “They’re going to go right to the battlefield.
I had countless conversations like this throughout my three years in Afghanistan. I was forced to rationalize America’s missteps to my Afghan brothers and sisters.
“I know, it’s hard brother,” I said. “But perhaps this can bring the Taliban to the table during intra-Afghan negotiations?”
LTG Alizai always chuckled when I tried to give him some of my talking points.
“I know you know better than that, brother,” he said. “But, I guess we all have our roles to play.”
LTG Alizai was right, of course. While our Afghan brothers welcomed home 1,000 prisoners of war, the Taliban leveraged their 5,000 prisoners immediately. These weren’t just any Taliban prisoners. They were the most experienced, lethal, and successful battlefield commanders in the Taliban’s ranks. These prisoners would murder, rape, and torture their way back into power—and that wouldn’t have been possible without Trump’s Doha Agreement.
“Active Defense”
“Hello, this is Domino's Pizza. May I take your order?”
Every time I called my brother, Lieutenant General Sami Sadat, on the phone, he always answered the same way. Even though he was in the fight for his life in Helmand, he hadn’t lost his sense of humor. It was April 2021; in less than six months, LTG Sami Sadat’s 215th Corps would fall after he was called to lead the Afghan National Army Special Operations Corps in the waning days of the Afghan republic.
“Hey, brother, how’s it going down in Helmand?”
“Will, it’s not like the Embassy, with that fancy underground pool, but we are fighting these Talibs with everything we got, but this stupid ‘active defense’ policy keeps up from being the agressor. Instead, we’re always reacting to them.”
Active defense seems like an Orwellian version of doublespeak, but during my last year, I heard that complaint from every senior Afghan general officer. Afghan Security Forces could repel Taliban attacks but could not conduct offensive operations.
American negotiators hoped that by tying the Afghans’ hands behind their back the Taliban would agree to intra-Afghan negotiations. To keep violence levels down–a reduction in violence (RIV)—the Taliban reduced high-profile attacks on urban centers. In turn, the United States restricted the Afghans from launching offensive operations.
That doesn’t mean that the Afghans remained on active defense. Instead, it meant the United States military would not provide close air support to the Afghan National Army. According to multiple senior Afghan General Officers, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive information, General Scott Miller, the last American Commander in Afghanistan, repeatedly warned senior Afghan general officers not to conduct offensive operations because close air support would no longer be provided, leading to the death of trusted Afghan allies.
Although the Afghan Air Force was a lethal and competent organization, it was less than two decades old. While the AAF, especially its Special Mission Wing, could execute daring missions, its maintainers struggled to keep up with such a grueling operation tempo.
How good was the Afghan Air Force? They successfully rescued an American pilot who crashed in Afghanistan.
“That was one of our most proud accomplishments,” Colonel Khial Shinwari, a former Afghan Air Force C-130 pilot, told GCV+F. “We rescued our own advisors.”
However, the Afghan military constantly needed close air support, especially since they were now restricted to “active defense.” By accepting such ridiculous rules of engagement, the AAF had to react to thousands of checkpoints scattered across Afghanistan.
“I flew missions constantly throughout Kandahar and Helmand,” Colonel Mahtabuddin Safi, a former AAF UH-60 Squadron Commander, told GCV+F. “It was impossible to respond to every firefight.”
The Trump administration’s decision to tie the Afghans’ hands behind their back proved deadly. The Taliban killed 3,000 Afghans during America’s fateful final year in Afghanistan, more than all US casualties combined. That would not have been possible without Trump’s absurd ‘active defense’ policy.
“Attacks on Coalition Forces”
The Doha Agreement’s most significant accomplishment was allowing America to retreat from the battlefield without being shot at. At least that’s what General Mark Miley, the former Chief of Joint Staff, eluded to during his testimony.
“There were a few attacks,” Milley testified. “But for the most part they abided by it.”
Thus, even by Milley’s testimony, the Taliban failed to abide by the most essential part of the entire agreement–not attacking American and coalition forces. But it wasn’t just a few errant indirect fire attacks. There were also improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on coalition forces. More importantly, the Taliban also regularly conducted surface-to-air-fire (SAFIRE) attacks against American and NATO pilots, a direct violation of Trump’s surrender agreement.
“The Taliban’s SAFIRE threat was a real thing,” a United States Air Force pilot, who requested anonymity to discuss the Taliban’s threat, told GCV+F. “We planned against it because it happened to other crews.”
While American injuries and deaths were kept at a minimum, the Taliban and their allies repeatedly broke the ceasefire agreement, putting thousands of American soldiers in jeopardy.
The Trump administration’s Doha Agreement is one of American history's most disastrous foreign policy blunders. Trump intentionally excluded our allies, forced them to release hardened killers, prevented them from going on the offensive, and put American forces in jeopardy.
The Biden administration, however, was under no obligation to accept an agreement with little legal standing, especially considering the Afghan government was a major Non-NATO ally and had a bilateral security agreement with the United States. Biden, instead, used Trump’s foolish agreement as a shield as he retreated from the battlefield. While Trump is responsible for the agreement, Biden is responsible for everything after, including his bewildering decision to ally with the Taliban and, thus, Al Qaeda.
Nevertheless, the Trump administration’s decision to stab our allies in the back belongs to him–and him alone.
In the end, it was Trump who wanted to invite the Taliban to Camp David. It was the Trump administration that signed a surrender agreement with a genocidal terrorist organization that killed thousands of Americans. It was the Trump administration that legitimized the Taliban by holding direct negotiations with a group drenched in American blood. And it was the Trump administration who routinely denigrated our allies who had fought for 20 years.
History will not be kind to the Trump administration for hundreds of reasons. Although the Doha Agreement does not compare to two impeachments, January 6, or other more prominent stories, it paved the way to the disaster that unfolded on August 15, 2021. The Taliban and Al Qaeda’s victory couldn’t have happened without the Doha Agreement.
He owns that, whether he wants to admit it or not.
Thank you for this ground truth reality check Will - and thank you for your continued service…
And here we are, roughly half the notoriously fickle American Electorate still think T. Rump is the best thing since yellow coloring was added to margarine during manufacture (youngsters who don't remember the little packets accompanying margarine will not have a clue).
Remember to vote, encourage others to do likewise, and wave as you fly over the Christian nationalist swamp of Oklahoma.